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ARGENTINA FACING INTERNATIONAL
CLAIMS OVER FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
Mercedes Ales,* Leonardo Granato** and Carlos Nahuel Oddone***
ABSTRACT
RGENTINA unilaterally adjusted the rules of foreign investment
by abandoning the convertibility regime which devalued the Ar-
gentine peso and caused subsequent pesification of the Argentine
economy. This caused a number of foreign investors to bring claims
against Argentina in front of the International Centre for Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes (ICSID).
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the convertibility regime's abandonment in 2002 (that had
pegged the Argentine currency to the U.S. dollar), thirty-two foreign in-
vestors' claims were brought before the International Centre for Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes (ICSID) against Argentina, with the total
amount claimed towering above twenty billion dollars. Simultaneously,
four claims were brought before the United Nations' ad hoc courts and
four others before the International Chamber of Commerce's (ICC) In-
ternational Court of Arbitration.
This issue is of particular importance to the Argentine government, as
well as to the country's population at large, because it impacts various
aspects of general economic and institutional development. Here we pre-
sent some points pertaining to the economic, social, and legal background
against which these disputes and their origins should be confronted.
With the abandonment of the convertibility regime of the national cur-
rency, the Argentine peso was devaluated and Argentina entered into a
process known as pesification of the economy. This required the compul-
sory conversion of all obligations acquired in foreign currency to Argen-
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tine pesos, the freezing of tariffs, and made it impossible for companies to
adjust their services' prices to changing values of the U.S. dollar or Euro.
In some cases this amounted to losses that could escalate up to 30 percent
of investors' finances. Argentina's unilateral adjustments to certain rules
of the game severely affected a large number of national and interna-
tional investors who trusted and backed Argentina, even in times of crisis.
In a context like this, foreign investors look to the remedies offered by
a series of international legal instruments called Bilateral Treaties for the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (BITs). It is impor-
tant to understand the significance of these agreements in order to under-
stand what is happening in Argentina today and its current situation
before the ICSID.
BITs are legal instruments that are signed by states and governed in
accordance with public international law. The objectives of BITs are to
establish clear and precise rules that promote investments between the
two signatories of the treaty, and to protect the foreign investors in one
state who invest in the other contracting state in the event of non-compli-
ance with terms of the investment. Pursuant to what is set forth in their
preambles, the aim of these treaties generally consists of promoting
greater cooperation between the contracting parties. The ultimate goal is
to achieve economic development for both countries and to increase the
communities' prosperity. Particular attention is paid to stimulating pri-
vate economic initiatives and the flow of private capital, as well as main-
taining a stable framework for investments with fair and equal treatment
of investors.
To date, the Argentine Republic has signed more than fifty BITs. A
significant number of these were signed in the 1990s with the large major-
ity taking effect between 1992 and 1995.1 Some of the most noteworthy
agreements are those signed with Great Britain, Italy, Spain, France, Ca-
nada, Germany, the United States, Austria, the Netherlands, China, and
Russia.
II. OBJECTIVES AND REASONS FOR SIGNING BITS
From the point of view of a country that exports capital (a developed
country), the relevance of such an instrument lies in the fact that it grants
their nation's investors reliable protection by means of a legally binding
and enforceable agreement with the state receiving capital, the host state,
so that the latter cannot alter its legislation arbitrarily to the detriment of
the foreign investors.2 By signing these agreements, states that receive
1. Ymaz Videla & Esteban M., Protecci6n de Inversiones Extranjeras. Tratados Bi-
laterales. Sus efectos en las Contrataciones Administrativas, La Ley [L.L.] 4-8
(1999) (Arg.).
2. Josd Augusto Fontoura Costa, Protecao e promocao do investimento estrangeiro
Mercosul - uma ferramenta para a implementaqao de um born clima de investi-
mentos? [Protection and Promotion of Foreign Investment in MERCOSUR-a
Tool to the Implementation of a Good Investment Climate?] 49 (2) Revista
Brasileira de Polftica Internacional [Rev. Bras. Polit. Int'l] 60, 64 (2006) (Brazil)
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foreign capital (developing countries) aim to develop legitimate and pro-
ductive investment. In return, a developing country promises to grant
foreign investors specific treatment and assures that its legal framework
will remain unchanged throughout the duration of the investment.
Because of the array of elements that contribute to a country or re-
gion's attractiveness to foreign investors, governments develop various
strategies to attract foreign capital. Signing and promoting BITs is one of
these key strategies. Some authors have classified this effort to provide a
more stable and reliable legal and juridical framework as a policy effort
to reduce the costs of government opportunism by limiting the capacity to
break settled agreements in order to achieve political profits. 3 This effort
is carried out on a triple basis: the self-assumed compromise by the state
to act according to the agreed rules; the decision to set out clear guide-
lines and definitions concerning the behaviour of the involved parties;
and the agreement to delegate in third parties (namely international arbi-
trators) the authority to interpret and apply the terms of the BIT.
The framework of a BIT is normally structured with two main pur-
poses. On one hand it protects foreign investors by fulfilling the need for
certainty and foreseeability (the renowned legal security) concerning do-
mestic regulations that govern investments. On the other hand it con-
secrates the international arbitration system, allowing it to resolve any
dispute that may arise in the course of the enterprise. International arbi-
tration consists of granting the individual investor the possibility of bring-
ing a claim before an international court or tribunal. The court or
tribunal is independent of the judicial structure of any party involved in
the dispute, including the state receiving the investment, and the state
accused of breaking the agreement. 4
In this context, any violation of the terms in the treaty by the con-
tracting parties will be considered a violation of the rules of international
law, which stipulates that agreements are made to be fulfilled. There are
negative consequences for a state that fails to fulfil its obligations before
the international community.5 In particular, when the measures taken by
the contracting state affect the investments made in accordance with the
(quoting Dunning, noting four main reasons that attract foreign investment in a
certain country: the search for resources (commodities and cheap but efficient la-
bor); search for new markets (formerly closed because of restrictions on free
trade); search for efficiency (vertical and horizontal integration of production
chains); and search for key assets (long term goals to be served by merging of new
alliances with existing investors in the host country).
3. Id., at 65.
4. Guido S. Tawil, Los Tratados de Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones.
La responsabilidad del Estado y el arbitraje internacional, La Ley [L.L.] (2000-D-
1106) (Arg.).
5. Hortensia Gutidrrez Posse, Acuerdos para promoci6n de inversiones extranjeras.
Sistemas de solucidn de controversias, in Los Convenios para la Promoci6n y Pro-
tecci6n Recfproca de Inversiones, INSTITUTO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL Y DE
LA NAVEGACION, ACADEMIA NACIONAL DE DERECHO Y CIENCIAS SOCIALES,
Buenos Aires, 9 (1993) (Arg.).
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legal safeguards and warranties ensured in the BIT, this amounts to a
direct or indirect expropriation of the investor's patrimony.
III. GENERAL CONTENT OF BITS
BITs signed by different countries worldwide contain similar mutual
provisions because they adhere to a standard model that the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) recom-
mended in 1962.
The agreements signed by Argentina contain two important clauses:
national treatment and most favored nation treatment. According to the
first clause, every contracting state is obliged to grant foreign investors
the same treatment as that accorded to its own nationals. National treat-
ment can be interpreted as formal equality between foreign and domestic
investments. But real and important differences between the develop-
ment levels of countries should not be overlooked because the actual im-
plementation of national treatment may require more than formal
equality. The clause may limit its applicability to the establishment of
foreign investment in the host country, or it may extend to periods before
and after the establishment of the foreign investment. Under the most
favored nation clause, 6 each state party is obliged to accord investors of
another contracting state treatment which is just as favorable as that
granted to its own investors or to investors of any third country.7 In other
words, the host country must extend to investors from diverse countries
the same or no less favorable treatment than it grants to investors from
any other foreign country. Like national treatment, most favored nation
treatment can be extended to pre-entry conditions or limited to those
affecting post-entry establishment. Both rules can be accepted in certain
circumstances and according to specific matters agreed to beforehand.
Countries that refuse to grant national treatment to foreign investors
act on a fear that granting national treatment to others would be detri-
mental to certain areas of their economy. This choice is the most respect-
ful of host country discretion but the least used. Most countries opt for
one of the various degrees of self-compromise. Many countries have de-
cided to grant post-establishment national treatment, preserving the right
to treat domestic and foreign investors differently at their point of entry,
or accepting certain key factors of the country's economy from the na-
tional treatment clause. Other nations choose to apply the national treat-
ment standard to pre-establishment as well, applying a very limited
6. Alicia M. Perugini, La definici6n de las personas ffsicas y la cidusula de la Naci6n
ms favorecida en los Convenios Bilaterales de Promoci6n y Protecci6n de las In-
versiones, in Los Convenios para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Recfproca de Inver-
siones, INSTITUTO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL Y DE LA NAVEGACION,
ACADEMIA NACIONAL DE DERECHO Y CIENCIAS SOCIALES, Buenos Aires, 47
(1993) (Arg.).
7. United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties at 39, U.N. Doc. ST/CrC/65 (1988).
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discretion by the host country regarding foreign investors' moment of
entry.
On the contrary, most favored nation treatment does not, in practice,
offer a wide range of possibilities for its implementation. Because this
standard is normally adopted within a national policy of attracting foreign
investors, few reasonable arguments justify better treatment of some for-
eign investors to the detriment of other foreign investors based solely on
their nationality. Such a course of action does not advance an open door
policy to attract the flow of capital.
Within MERCOSUR, the trend has been to reconcile a combination of
national treatment and most favored nation treatment with a negative list
of exceptions and state control. Using the latter approach in relation to
non-member states, and the former for MERCOSUR (Southern Com-
mon Market) eradicated investors. 8
In addition, BITs outline a regime for the direct expropriation of in-
vestments. These instruments acknowledge the contracting state's right
to take investments made in their country as long as this process fulfils a
series of requirements strictly listed in the terms of the applicable BIT,
and as long as due compensation is paid. Expropriation has been a his-
torical concern for all foreign investors who operate within the territory
and jurisdiction of a host country and are thus subject to its legislative
and administrative control. This concern requires a study by the investor
of the political risks involved, a shift in government or in ideologies, or a
sudden economic or financial change in the overall panorama which may
alter the national policy towards foreign investment and the taking of
property. Therefore, most BITs allow countries to expropriate on a non-
discriminatory basis, for a public purpose, and against the payment of
compensation. 9
Expropriation, particularly indirect expropriation, is a much debated
issue. This becomes obvious when we consider that the first BITs were
signed during the 1960s, a decade marked by the decolonization process,
the implementation of import protectionist policies, and the assertion of
national sovereignty over natural resources in most developing countries.
Most agreements extend expropriation provisions to the ambiguous
concept of measures which are equivalent or similar to expropriation.
These provisions do not define expropriation, nationalization, or an effect
equivalent to expropriation. The introduction of such a broad concept
creates a disadvantageous position for the host state, limiting its capacity
to act in cases of emergency with regulatory agencies.10 A very broad
8. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), New York-
Geneva, 2000, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999 (UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2) at
93.
9. UNCTAD, New York-Geneva, 2007, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006:
Trends in Investment Rulemaking, (UNCTAD/ITE/IIT2006/5) at 44 [hereinafter
Trends in Investment Rulemaking].
10. Pedro Da Motta Veiga, The International Regime on Investments: A Problematic
Status Quo, an Uncertain Future, Cdtedra Internacional OMC-IR, Barcelona,
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and over-comprehensive concept of indirect expropriation could imply
that a country's routine regulatory acts fall within it." In reality, many
host states are developing countries in which frequent situations of eco-
nomic and social unrest need to be faced with governmental measures to
prevent the dissolution of the state.12 Even if it were agreed that these
provisions should be applicable only when a state's actions substantially
affect the value of an investment, a broad array of regulatory actions
could have this effect.
There is no settled definition or standard defining what measures
amount to indirect expropriation, as court precedents are scarce and con-
tractual definitions are vague. Nevertheless, tribunals, both national and
international, assume jurisdiction to review the treatment of foreign in-
vestors by a host state and assess whether there has been any form of
compensable expropriation.13
BITs can be classified into three groups in relation to their treatment of
indirect expropriation. The first group contains no provision at all, leav-
ing it to a dispute settlement tribunal to eventually decide whether the
investor can invoke protection in the case of an indirect expropriation. A
second group includes protection from both types of expropriation. A
third category aims to provide implicit guidance regarding the level of
interference required. Furthermore, regarding conditions required for
lawful expropriation, most BITs concluded since 1995 include a reference
that the host state is to respect due process (understood as the affected
party's right to an audience and an impartial hearing to review the case
and its merits) and a provision for compensation in a freely convertible
currency with the possibility of applicable interest. 14
Another provision usually contained in BITs refers to war and civil
disturbance, which includes exceptional situations where an investor's as-
sets are harmed due to the outbreak of international hostilities or a state
of national emergency, such as a revolution, revolt, insurrection, or riot.
In these instances, the provisions require that the host country provide
non-discriminatory treatment to foreign investors, granting them the
same rights and compensation that a domestic investor would obtain
under similar circumstances. Even though this situation is different than
an expropriation, the dividing line between expropriation and civil distur-
bance, which requires a government to take emergency measures that af-
fect investors' freedom of contract, can be hard to draw.
Spain (Jan. 29-30, 2007) in International Seminar: The New Agenda for Interna-
tional Trade Relations as the Doha Round Draws to an End at 19.
11. Trends in Investment Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 58.
12. See Howard Mann & Konrad von Moltke, NAFTA's Chapter 11 and the Environ-
ment, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 1999 (working
paper). In respect to public good and regulatory measures.
13. Veiga, supra note 10 (citing Luke Eric Peterson, Bilateral Investment Treaties and
Development Policy-Making, IISD, Nov., 2004).
14. Trends in Investment Rulemaking, supra note 9, at 45-52.
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Provisions outlining the process for resolving investment disputes com-
prise the most important piece of any agreement. Investment disputes
may involve investors from both states, one state and an investor from
another state, or two states that are parties to the treaty. These disputes
are addressed in different ways according to the actors involved. Dis-
putes between private individuals or corporations are normally settled
within the internal judicial system of the state that has jurisdiction. Dis-
putes between one private party and a signatory state, usually acting as a
host state, are settled by third-party dispute settlement mechanisms such
as consultation, negotiation, and arbitration. 15
This last process authorizes a foreign investor to submit a dispute to an
international court of arbitration for decision. In some cases, this re-
quires the exhaustion of certain preliminary proceedings which may in-
clude bringing the claim before the national courts of the non-compliant
state. A foreign investor harmed by a measure adopted by the country
that received the investment can submit the dispute to the local courts of
the alleged offending state, ICSID arbitration, arbitration of the ICC In-
ternational Court of Arbitration, or an ad hoc court established in accor-
dance with the rules of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Enforcement is carried out in accordance
with the principles and rules set forth in the UN Convention on the Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which was signed
in New York in 1958. This offers the possibility of a quick, neutral, and
unbiased resolution of disputes that is removed from political interfer-
ence. According to the terms laid down in BITs signed by Argentina, the
awards granted by the corresponding courts of arbitration are definitive
and binding for the parties involved.
IV. FOREIGN INVESTMENTS, GLOBALIZATION
AND THE LAW
Financial globalization is a fundamental characteristic of the current
state of international economic relations. In this sense, the free move-
ment of capital across national borders (two billion dollars per day are in
circulation 16) forms part of the framework of the modern world's econ-
omy. The past fifty years have seen major changes in the regulation of
the treatment of the foreign investor. These changes link directly to the
internal economic, legal, social, and political factors of a country, which
directly determine the regime a state provides to regulate its foreign
investments.
The development and momentum of foreign investments played key
roles in the current globalization process, particularly in the 1990s. espe-
15. Pierre Sauvd, Trade and Investment Rules: Latin American Perspectives, Comision
Economica para America Latina y el Caribe (UN-CEPAL), DIVISION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT, 2006, at 27 (Chile).
16. Benjamin Hopenhayn & Alejandro Vanoli, La globalizaci6n financiera: Genesis,
auge, crisis y reformas FONDO DE CULTURA ECONOMICA, at 16 (2002) (Arg.).
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cially because of their impact on the development of national and re-
gional economies. In this globalized world, the law ceases to be an
exclusive legal concept pertaining to each state and becomes a common
regulatory law of activities that, traditionally, was under a state's sover-
eign authority. Likewise, it has acquired an instrumental nature by be-
coming a means to resolve conflicts between states and nationals of other
states, displacing the traditional diplomatic methods of resolving disputes
between states. In this context, BITs were developed in order to consoli-
date a general regulating model that is uniform in its treatment. This was
achieved by institutionalising a series of laws and guarantees for the for-
eign investor, obliging a state receiving capital to respect such laws. By
transcending the legal system of each particular state and adhering to in-
ternational arbitration methods, these agreements aim at positioning both
parties on the same level, and to a certain extent obviating the sover-
eignty of the state.
BITs are one of the most important instruments for the international
protection of foreign investments. The first BIT was signed in 1959 and
the number of these instruments has increased dramatically since then,
especially during the 1990s. By the end of 1999, the number of BITs
reached 1,857, the majority of which were signed between developed
countries and developing nations.17 Due to the increase in the number of
BITs during the 1990s, today an overwhelming half of investment flows
from developed countries to developing countries consist of trade and
financial agreements reached under BIT provisions. 8 The majority of
these agreements are bilateral, which marks a difference in trends be-
tween the early to mid-1990s and the last years of that decade through the
beginning of 2000.
V. ARGENTINEAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Even though BITs have existed since the late 1950s, it was not until the
1980s that Latin American countries began signing these international
agreements.19 Out of all the MERCOSUR countries, the Republic of
Argentina, in the 1990s, made the most progress in terms of protecting
the foreign investor. It has signed a much greater number of bilateral
agreements with capital-exporting countries than any other
MERCOSUR nation. Furthermore, it has firmly accepted international
arbitration. In 1989, for the first time, Argentina accepted offers to nego-
tiate agreements for the reciprocal promotion and protection of invest-
ments. On May 22, 1990, it reached its first agreement with Italy and
thereafter the number of treaties it signed continued to increase until
2000.
17. UNCTAD, Investment Instruments Online: Bilateral Investment Treaty Database
(2007) http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch.aspx?id=779
18. Veiga, supra note 10, at 5.
19. See Costa, supra note 2, at 74; see also Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999,
supra note 8, at 2.
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This practice was accompanied by a new foreign investments law
(21.383/93 and Dec. 1853/93) and by an economic policy that, at that time,
aimed mainly at providing foreign investors with greater access to the
Argentine economy of goods and services. 20 Even today, after the 2001
default, Argentina continues to sign BITs in accordance with the latest
trend in this field: the signing of BITs between developing countries, par-
ticularly Latin American nations. The signing of BITs by developing
countries is set against a background of capital flow in which the financial
and economic gap between both parties is comparatively reduced. Thus
the actual possibility of compliance with the obligations assumed in the
treaty is higher than when the gap is broader, as is the case with many
BITs signed by developing and developed countries. Nevertheless, this
new wave of BITs is embraced by Argentina which signed BITs with
other Latin American countries that are not members of MERCOSUR,
such as Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.
In the Argentine constitutional system, following the 1994 reform, in-
ternational agreements went on to be hierarchically superior to national
laws, compelling Argentina to abide internally with the obligations as-
sumed in these treaties.
VI. CLAIMS AGAINST ARGENTINA
At the end of 2001, economic indicators of great importance reached
catastrophic proportions. The GDP fell more than ten percent in relation
to the previous year.21 The economy went through a recession beginning
in early 1998, and the country suffered from unprecedented levels of de-
flation, unemployment, and poverty. Unemployment during that time
reached twenty-five percent, and approximately half of the Argentine
population was living in extreme levels of poverty.22 The basic services of
health and social security were on the brink of collapse.
It seemed impossible to avoid Public Emergency Law 25.561/02 sanc-
tions as a necessary and opportune measure to combat the social and
economic crisis facing the country.2 3 The state of emergency allowed the
government to orchestrate a package of social containment measures that
made it possible to maintain the essential operating services which pre-
served internal peace and the very existence of the Argentine State. In
20. In the 1990s MERCOSUR became a major receiver of capital, especially in Brazil
and Argentina. This type of undertaking cannot develop if there is a lack of ade-
quate financing. In this sense, promoting and protecting foreign investors is linked
to the conditions that the integration process must create to guarantee the devel-
opment of investment at a regional level. The investment policy deployed by Ar-
gentina since the beginning of 1990 generated some sort of imbalance in relation to
the rest of the MERCOSUR countries, as much from a constitutional and integra-
tionist viewpoint as from the number of treaties signed and the acceptance of in-
ternational arbitration.
21. Veiga, supra note 10, at 5.
22. Fountoura Costa, supra note 2, at 74 and UNCTAD supra note 8, at 2.
23. Carlos Nahuel Oddone, Mercados Emergentes y Crisis Financiera Internacional,
Eumed.net (2004), html://www.eumed.net/curseconllibreria/2004/cno/index.htm.
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equal sense, the prorogation of the state of emergency facilitated the pro-
cess of economic recovery and served as a take-off platform for important
social and economic indicators, allowing Argentina to slowly emerge out
of the crisis..
The modification of the convertibility regime and the later pesification
of the Argentine economy made it necessary to review and renegotiate
contracts for public service provisions, with the object of recomposing the
structure of prices and yields. The Argentinean government maintains
that the economic emergency regulations of 2001 and 2003 were neces-
sary to cope with a situation of extreme civil unrest and that they equally
affected nationals and foreigners and were thus non-discriminatory. The
government further maintains that no foreign investor was deprived of
his/her property, and that in resolving its differences with the state, no
foreign company was deprived of its right to access the courts or its right
to due process.
At present, claims against Argentina are being brought before ICSID
by more than thirty foreign investors. The main allegations that sustain
such claims are: (a) the suspension and subsequent repeal of tariff adjust-
ments based on price indices that were provided for in contracts for the
provision of public services; (b) the elimination of dollar tariffs; and (c)
restrictions on foreign transfers. Following written submissions, it
emerged that the largest number of claims are expected to find legitimacy
based on the harm caused by general measures adopted by the Republic
of Argentina as a result of the most severe economic and social crisis that
the country has suffered in recent years.
VII. NEW PERSPECTIVES
It is clear that the outcome of the current situation regarding pending
claims is far from being resolved. The final solution is likely to be one of
political compromise between investors, investor's countries, and Argen-
tina. This solution will most likely compel the future signing of new BITs
in which new rules of the game will be set and a renewal of expectations
and goals will be formulated. The new government that took office De-
cember 10, 2007 has shown a more friendly approach to foreign investors
and a more open willingness to listen to foreign claims.
In the likely event of a future renegotiation, by means of signing new
agreements, it would be advisable to approach the issue of mutual com-
promise with a view towards the principle of flexibility. 24 Those in charge
of striking an agreement should bear in mind the overall situation of the
Argentine economy through the last three decades. While most BITs be-
tween Argentina and foreign investors from developed countries were
reached during the 1990s, a period of economic and financial growth for
Argentina, the previously unstable economic background that dominated
24. UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements: Flexibility For Development,
New York-Geneva 2000 (UNCTAD/TE/IIT/18) at 2.
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most of the 1980s should not have been overlooked. Had the experience
of the 1990s been taken into account together with that of the 1980s, a
more comprehensive and realistic approach to the framework of mutual
expectations and obligations might have been achieved and may have
helped to prevent the unfortunate outcome of the current decade.
The principle of flexibility is based on the goal of achieving overall
global development for developed and developing countries. 25 But
mostly, it denotes the capacity of a legal instrument to serve and be
adapted to various uses in order to maximize its effectiveness. It has a
decisive influence on the elaboration and the overall structure of interna-
tional investment agreements, and it encompasses aspects such as grant-
ing lower levels of obligations for developing countries, asymmetrically
phased implementation timetables, best endeavour commitments, excep-
tions from commitments in certain areas, flexibility in the application of
and adherence to disciplines under set circumstances, and technical assis-
tance and training. 26 International practice is increasingly taking into ac-
count the particular situation of each country in order to tailor
agreements that would allow realistic goals both for the investor country,
which can gain an added degree of security knowing the real prospects of
its investment, and the host country that can count on realistically imple-
menting its obligations and offering added security and trustworthiness to
the investor.
Any international investment agreement, BITs included, by its very na-
ture reduces the autonomy of the participating countries.27 Considering
that the parties involved include governments that must look out for the
general well being of their nation, and that must face the real demands of
their particular national situation, it is essential that these agreements
recognize the important differences in the characteristics of the parties
involved, especially those regarding economic asymmetries and levels of
development (not only economic but social, political, and cultural) be-
tween countries. Otherwise, agreements that are signed against a back-
ground of formal symmetry obscuring an underlying asymmetry often run
the risk of becoming virtually ineffective and of little or no use to every
party involved.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Both national and foreign investors clearly saw themselves harmed by
the changes introduced in economic regulations laid down by Argentina's
national government in 2001 and 2003. Privatized companies rendering
public services that registered their claims with ICSID are demanding
25. Id. at 2-3.
26. Id. at 18-24. Flexibility can be present in Esther, the substantive provisions reflect-
ing development concerns and an overall balance of rights and obligations; in the
application stage of the Agreement; and the possibility of subsequent partial or
extensive revisions of terms.
27. Id. at 6.
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prompt, adequate, and effective compensation from the Argentinean Re-
public claiming that the measures adopted by the government have
caused them considerable harm and losses, an effect similar to indirect
expropriation. The government has responded that these companies con-
tinue to render their services with all their assets and invoices and receive
tariffs and rates in a normal and regular manner. Because a large major-
ity of these companies took credit from foreign banks at a time when the
convertibility regime prevailed in Argentina, such contracts with the
banks were governed by foreign laws. This made it very difficult for these
companies to fulfil their obligations, especially because adjusting set tar-
iffs was prohibited.
Concerning the problem at hand, Argentina's strategy is to present
these measures as necessary and inevitable means of addressing the ex-
traordinary crisis in which the country was submerged by the end of 2001.
It is fair to acknowledge that such policing measures were ordered by the
national government in a true state of emergency and necessity, a matter
that is extremely relevant when deciding whether or not the Argentinean
State has committed indirect expropriation and whether harm suffered by
the investors is worthy of compensation.
It is likely that in the medium term contract renegotiation is the most
viable measure that could benefit both parties to the dispute, privatized
companies and the national government. Without a doubt, once again,
the Argentineans' quality of life depends on a matter that still seems to
be unresolved.
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